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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved
tremendous success in many tasks of machine learning, such as
the image classification. Unfortunately, researchers have shown
that DNNs are easily attacked by adversarial examples, slightly
perturbed images which can mislead DNNs to give incorrect
classification results. Such attack has seriously hampered the
deployment of DNN systems in areas where security or safety
requirements are strict, such as autonomous cars, face recog-
nition, malware detection. Defensive distillation is a mechanism
aimed at training a robust DNN which significantly reduces the
effectiveness of adversarial examples generation. However, the
state-of-the-art attack can be successful on distilled networks
with 100% probability. But it is a white-box attack which needs
to know the inner information of DNN. Whereas, the black-box
scenario is more general. In this paper, we first propose the
-neighborhood attack, which can fool the defensively distilled
networks with 100% success rate in the white-box setting, and it
is fast to generate adversarial examples with good visual quality.
On the basis of this attack, we further propose the region-
based attack against defensively distilled DNNs in the black-
box setting. And we also perform the bypass attack to indirectly
break the distillation defense as a complementary method. The
experimental results show that our black-box attacks have a
considerable success rate on defensively distilled networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have led to major break-
throughs in recent years and have been powerful tools in
various applications, including computer vision [1], [2], [3],
speech recognition [4], natural language processing [5], health-
care [6], [7], etc. Despite DNNs’ huge success, researchers
have discovered that they are vulnerable to deliberate attacks.
An attacker can generate a slightly modified sample, called
adversarial example [8], to mislead a DNN to give an incorrect
output. This kind of attack is particularly horrible in security-
critical systems, such as autonomous cars [9], face recognition
[10], malware detection [11]. But the existence of attacks can
motivate more researches about how to defense adversarial
examples and get a more robust DNN.
Many studies focus on attack methods, that is, how to
generate adversarial examples. In image classification task,
some of these attacks are based on the gradient of network,
such as FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) [12], FGV (Fast
Gradient Value) [13], JSMA (Jacobian Saliency Map Attack)
[14], and some are based on solving optimization problems
using different methods such as L-BFGS [8], Deepfool [15],
C&W attack (by Carlini & Wagner) [16]. They have their
own merits and defects in attack success rate, runtime, visual
quality of generated adversarial examples.
CIFAR10
original adversarial examples
ImageNet
original adversarial example
Fig. 1: An illustration of our generated adversarial examples
for RGB images in CIFAR10 on distilled network and in Ima-
geNet on Inception-v3. In the first two row, the original labels
of the two images are {truck, horse}, and the three columns
of adversarial examples correspond to three randomly selected
randomly selected target classes {airplane, automobile,bird}.
The original class of the ImageNet image in the third row is
{fly}, and the target class is {house finch}. Results show that
the adversarial perturbations are imperceptible by human eyes.
Many researchers have proposed various defense methods
against above attacks. These defenses try to make DNNs
still give the correct output on adversarial examples or make
the success rate of generating adversarial examples decrease
significantly. The basic ideas are roughly divided into two
categories. One is based on image preprocessing [17], [18],
[19], taking advantage of the spatial instability of adversarial
examples. Before feeding an input image into a DNN, people
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will perform some operation on it in the spatial domain, such
as adding noise, JPEG compression, cropping, rotation, etc.
And other ideas focus on getting a new robust DNN for
adversarial examples by modifying the network architecture
or the training process [20], [21], [22].
Defensive distillation [21] is a strong defensive mechanism
based on training a new robust network by using the distillation
method. It can significantly reduce the effectiveness of adver-
sarial examples on DNNs. But Carlini and Wagner propose
a powerful attack (C&W attack) that can still acquire 100%
success rate on DNNs trained with defensive distillation [16],
which is the state-of-the-art attack. However, C&W attack still
has room for improvement. First, it needs a long runtime to
generate an adversarial example. And besides, it is a white-
box attack, that is, attackers need to know the output inside
the network. In the actual adversarial environment, the black-
box attack is more practical, that is, attackers only know the
output probability vector of the classification result.
In this paper, we first propose an -neighborhood attack on
defensively distilled networks in the white-box setting, which,
as we will illustrate below, achieves high visual quality and
is able to generate adversarial examples of any target class
very fast. On this basis, we further propose a novel region-
based attack on distilled networks in the black-box setting. To
the best of our knowledge, this attack is the first attempt to
generate adversarial examples with only access to the output
classification probabilities of a distilled network.
Given an image, our -neighborhood attack limits the up-
per bound of perturbation  to each pixel, thus facilitating
the control of modification to original images, and ensuring
no obvious bright spots appear in the generated adversarial
examples. On ImageNet [23] classification task, our attack
can cause the Inception-v3 [24] to misclassify all the image
into target class, and the largest perturbation to each pixel
is even no more than 2. Actually, our large-scale experiment
shows that we can achieve over 70% success rate even if 
is fixed to 1, for example, as shown in Fig.1. Human eyes
cannot completely tell the difference between the adversarial
examples and the original ones. In addition, our method is fast
to execute. And if the preset upper bound  goes up, it can be
even faster.
As we mentioned above, the state-of-the-art attack (C&W
attack) can only against defensively distilled networks in the
white-box setting. However, in many real-world cases, such
as machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS), an attacker only
has access to the final output probabilities for an image, that
is to say, he cannot get any results of the inner layers. In
this black-box setting, distilled networks can against all the
published attacks. It seems that the defensive mechanism is
very effective. However, our proposed region-based attack can
succeed in finding adversarial examples on distilled networks.
And we then introduce the bypass attack to guarantee a high
success rate under different conditions (various distillation
temperatures of the distilled models), which indirectly breaks
the distillation defense. We will show that once a low-
temperature model is accessible, its corresponding enhanced
models with high temperatures will be no longer unsecure and
easily attacked by our bypass method.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We propose an -neighborhood attack to defensively
distilled networks with 100% success rate in the white-
box setting. This attack limits the maximum perturbation,
denoted as , of each pixel in an image, thus ensuring a
good visual quality of the generated adversarial examples.
Our experiments show that this attack is fast to execute.
• We present a region-based attack on defensively distilled
networks in the black-box setting, which, to our best
knowledge, is the first attemp. Better still, our generated
adversarial examples are robust to noise.
• We further introduce bypass attack on the basis of our
region-based attack as a complementary method in the
black-box setting. We provide experimental results to
indicate that by the bypass attack, any enhanced models
with high distillation temperature for security concern
will become unsecure with the assistance of a low-
temperature model.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations for Deep Neural Networks
In this paper, we focus on DNNs for image m-classification
task. A trained DNN is represented as f : x → y, where
x ∈ Rn is an input normalized image and y ∈ Rm is an output
vector, representing the probabilities of the image belonging
to each class. The raw input is a grayscale image or a three-
dimensional RGB image, and here we scale every pixel from
range [0,255] to [0,1]. The output vector y = (y1, y2, ..., ym)
satisfies
∑m
i=1 yi = 1, and yi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, ...m. We define
f as the full neural network, including several hidden layers
for extracting features and a softmax layer for mapping real
output values of a network to a probability vector,
f(x) = softmax(fn(fn−1(...f1(x)...))) = y,
where fi is the inner layer function. Z(x) = z =
(z1, z2, ...zm) ∈ Rm is the pre-softmax result vector (called
logits), that is, y =softmax(Z(x)). The softmax function is as
follows:
softmax(z)i =
ezi∑m
i=1 e
zi
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
B. Targeted Attack and Untargeted Attack
Targeted attack is aimed at producing adversarial examples
that force the DNN to misclassify them into a specific target
class. For an original image x with its original true label
C(x) = arg maxi yi, the attacker chooses a particular target
class Ct 6= C(x), and a targeted attack is to find an adversarial
example x′, which is close to x, satisfying its result label
arg maxi y
′
i = Ct.
The untargeted attack is to make the DNN classify the
produced adversarial example into any other class except the
original one. Attackers try to find x′ so that arg maxi y
′
i 6=
C(x). Previous researches have shown that an untargeted
attack is easier to succeed. So in this paper, we focus on the
more challenging targeted attack.
C. White-box Attack and Black-box Attack
According to how much information attackers know about
the DNN, attacks can be divided into white-box and black-
box attack. In the white-box setting, attackers have all the
knowledge about the architecture, parameters, training set of
the network, and intermediate results of inner layers (e.g.
logits). It is a more favorable situation for attackers to produce
adversarial examples.
As for the black-box, attackers do not have knowledge of
the network. They only have access to the output probability
vector y of the DNN. They can query the DNN for any input
according to their needs. It is more difficult for attackers to
generate adversarial examples. In this paper, we discuss attacks
of both two settings above.
D. Success Rate of Attack
In a targeted attack, a successful adversarial example can
mislead the network to classify it into the target class. Here
we define the success rate as the proportion of adversarial
examples, whose classification result is the target label, to
all our test images, regardless of whether the original images
classification results are correct or not.
III. KNOWN ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
A. Known Attacks
1) FGSM: Fast gradient sign method [12] is a gradient-
based fast algorithm of computing adversarial perturbation
with a `∞ constraint. It explores the gradient direction of the
loss function Loss(x, t) and adds a fixed perturbation to the
original image. Attackers can get adversarial example x′ from:
x′ = x− τ · sign(∇xLoss(x, t)),
where τ is usually a small value to control the modification
magnitude. Loss(x, t) represents the cost of classifying x into
the target class t. FGSM is just designed to be computationally
efficient rather than an optimal attack.
2) JSMA: Jacobian saliency map attack [14] is another
gradient-based method, which uses the calculated saliency map
to modify one pixel with the highest saliency maps value
in each iteration, until the classification result turns to the
target class. This method modifies images more precisely at
the expense of a greater computing cost than FGSM.
3) Deepfool: Deepfool [15] generates an adversarial exam-
ple by exploring the nearest decision boundary and crossing it
to deceive the network. It is an untargeted attack. It is usually
difficult to solve the problem directly, so it assumes DNN
is linear with hyperplanar decision boundary. The optimal
update direction is obtained step by step in an iterative way.
The image is modified a little to reach the boundary in each
iteration, until reaching and going across it.
4) C&W: C&W attack [16] is the state-of-the-art white-box
attack at the time of our work. The attack can be targeted or
untargeted and has three forms based on different distortion
measures (`2, `0, `∞). Its `2 form has the best performance.
In this paper, all the referred C&W attack in the following
sections is its `2 norm. It constructs adversarial examples by
solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
δ
‖δ‖2 + c · l(x+ δ)
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(1)
The objective is to find the smallest perturbation measured by
`2 norm (represented by the first term ‖δ‖2) and it can make
the network misclassify it into the target class (represented
by the second term l(x + δ)). The loss function l(·) reflects
the distance between the current situation and the objective of
attack and is defined as:
l(x) = max(maxi 6=t{Z(x)i} − Z(x)t,−κ)
Z(x) is the logits mentioned in Section II, t is the target
label, and κ, called confidence, is a hyper-parameter for en-
hancing the transferability to other models, which is discussed
detailedly in [16]. Under normal circumstances, attackers can
set κ = 0. When maxi 6=t{Z(x)i} − Z(x)t > 0, it means the
adversarial example x is not classified into the target class, so it
is not a successful attack. When maxi 6=t{Z(x)i}−Z(x)t ≤ 0,
it implies a successful adversarial example. In addition, C&W
attack turns an optimization problem with a box constraint
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n, into an unconstrained problem by replacing δ
with 12 (tanh(w)+1)−x, where w is a new optimizer ranging
in (−∞,+∞). So various optimization algorithms which are
only suitable for unconstrained problems can be used.
5) ZOO: Zeroth Order Optimization attack [25] is a black-
box attack inspired by C&W. It substitutes log f(x) for logits
Z(x) in the loss function, so attackers just need to query the
final classification vector f(x). And ZOO can solve the new
optimization problem by stochastic coordinate descent method,
ADAM optimizer, or Newtons method. In addition, to make
the attack more efficient, it reduces the attack-space dimension
by resizing the perturbation from high to low. However, this
attack is not designed for defensively distilled networks.
B. Known Defenses
1) Detecting adversarial examples: Many reseaches focus
on detecting adversarial examples [26], [27], [28], [29]. A
detector needs to distinguish whether the input image is an
adversarial example or not, so it is a binary classification
problem. Once the image is detected to be adversarial, it may
be manually labeled. But if so, the entire system won’t be fully
automatic. Hence, only detecting adversarial examples but not
trying to classifying it into the correct class, is a weak defense
mechanism.
2) Pre-processing input: It is a simple method that pre-
processing all the input images before feeding them into a
classifier to eliminate adversarial perturbations. This utilizes
that adversarial examples are not spatially robust. When de-
fenders interfere with them, they may recover to the original
class and not be adversarial examples anymore. Some common
operations are adding noise, JPEG compression [18], crop-
ping, rotating, etc. In addition, some researchers use principal
component analysis to reduce dimension for input images and
remove adversarial perturbations [30]. And autoencoders are
also used for reconstructing the adversarial example in order
to make it recover to the original label [29].
3) Adversarial training: Adversarial training [22] is aimed
at training a new robust network by adding adversarial ex-
amples into the training set. Defensers train a network using
both normal images and adversarial examples, so that the
network learns the features from both of them and can classify
adversarial examples correctly. However, adversarial training
method is not robust to strong attacks like C&W and our work,
it cannot recognize adversarial examples that do not appear
during training [19].
4) Defensive distillation: Defensive distillation [21] is a
strong defense mechanism of training a robust network which
makes it almost impossible for many gradient-based attacks to
generate adversarial examples on it, because its output proba-
bilities is too “hard”. In this defense, the softmax function is
modified as follows,
F (x) =
[
ezi/T∑m
i=1 e
zi/T
]
i∈0...m
,
where T is the distillation temperature. First, it trains a teacher
model with the new softmax function, and then for each
sample in the training set, feeds them into the teacher model
to obtain its corresponding “soft” label. After that, it trains the
distilled network on the soft labels.
“soft”: 0.0001, 0.0009, 0.0031, 0.9704, 0.0004,..., 0.0000
“hard”: 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 1.0000, 0.0000,..., 0.0000
Soft and hard labels are just shown as above for example.
The trained distilled network will then have a good defensive
performance.
IV. OUR -NEIGHBORHOOD ATTACK
In this section, we present our algorithm in details. Our
proposed -neighborhood attack is aimed at finding an ad-
versarial example, in which the perturbation to each pixel of
original image does not exceed . The hyper-parameter  can
be considered as the perturbation intensity that attackers can
tolerate. It is an important adjustable parameter controlled
by attackers as needed to balance the running speed and
visual quality. Here, we will describe our new objective
function within the constraint of , and explain why it has
good performance in distillation resistance, speed, and visual
quality.
A. Objective Function
Our goal is to search an adversarial perturbation δ with an
upper limit  for a normalized image x to turn it into a target
label t, and the perturbed image x′ still needs to be a valid
image. That is to say, we try to find an adversarial example
in the -neighborhood of the original image. It is described as
follows:
find δ, s.t. arg max f(x+ δ) = t
δ ∈ [−, ]n
δ + x ∈ [0, 1]n,
(2)
where x ∈ [0, 1] is fixed, and  ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed but attacker-
adjustable hyper-parameter. It is hard to solve the problem
above, so we usually convert it to an optimization problem by
introducing loss functions. So we move on to the problem:
minimize
δ
Lt(x+ δ),
s.t. δ ∈ [−, ]n
δ + x ∈ [0, 1]n.
(3)
Here, the loss funtion Lt(·) we used in our -neighborhood
attack is inspired by C&W [16], which is defined as
Lt(x) = max(maxi6=t{Z(x)i} − Z(x)t,−κ). (4)
The details have been mentioned in Section III-A4.
Our goal is to reduce Lt(x+ δ) to below 0. If so, the logit
of the target class is the largest, and so is its corresponding
probability. Therefore the output is our target label. And the
attack will be successful.
Compared with the optimization problem (1) mentioned
in Section III-A4, our problem (3) is different. We do not
minimize the term ‖δ‖2, instead, we only minimize the loss
function directly. We use an adjustable parameter  to control
how much perturbation will be added. The experiments in
Section VI-B will show that this parameter can guarantee
image visual quality very well. Better still, our optimization
objective with only one term (previous work all two terms)
improves the processing speed greatly.
Our optimization problem is box-constraint, for which many
optimizers are not suitable. But previous work has presented
several solutions, like L- BFGS-B, projected gradient descent,
variable substitution, etc. Here we take the idea of variable
substitution, that is, we turn the box-constraint problem to an
unconstrained optimization. Its difficulty lies in our optimiza-
tion has two constraints, we transform the original constraints
to the following inequality:
max(−+ x, 0) ≤ δ + x ≤ min(+ x, 1) (5)
We use tanh(·) to substitute for the original variable δ with
a new variable w. To respect the constraint of inequality (5),
we derive the following equation:
δ =
b− a
2
tanhw +
b+ a
2
− x,
where, a = max(−+ x, 0), b = min(+ x, 1).
Since −1 ≤ tanhw ≤ 1, we have
a ≤ δ + x ≤ b,
which is the same as inequality (5). Hence, the new optimiza-
tion problem we focus on is as follows:
minimize
w
Lt(
b− a
2
tanhw +
b+ a
2
). (6)
Formula (6) is our final objective function.
Compared with the original problem (3), there is no con-
straint in our new optimization problem. Note that, given x
and , a and b will be determined immediately. Thus we
have an unconstraint optimization problem1. There have many
optimizers to choose, such as Gradient Descent Optimizer,
Adagrad Optimizer, Momentum Optimizer, Adam Optimizer,
etc. After our experiments on them, we adopt Adam as the
optimizer to solve the new problem (6), which can find desired
w with the fastest convergence speed.
B. Distillation Resistance
As described in Section III-B4, using distillation in the
training process will make the network more robust. When
feeding an image x into a distilled network, the output
classification vector f(x) is “hard”, which means its largest
probability is 1.0 or very close to 1.0, and others are all 0 or
nearly 0. This makes the gradient of f(x) is also almost always
0. Therefore the attacks based on gradient are deactivated,
because they cannot get effective gradient value to compute
the needed adversarial perturbation (like FGSM attack) or
solve the optimization problem (like L-BFGS, JSMA attack).
However, our -neighborhood attack and previous C&W attack
can resist distillation due to the fact that we use the logits
before the softmax layer instead of the probability, so the
“hard” output has no effect on us. What we should not ignore
is that there still exist some method which uses logits but
cannot resist distillation. This is because the distilled network
also causes considerable variation of the output logits, called
“hard” logits (the large values become much larger and the
small values become much smaller), it is so difficult to find a
kind of perturbation to change the rankings of logits directly.
However, the loss function of our -neighborhood attack is the
difference between the maximum value of other logits (except
target class logits) and the target class logits. So what we care
are only two logits values. No matter how big the disparity
there becomes between these logits, it is possible to make
the difference between the two values very small to 0. This
has nothing to do with “hard” logits caused by distillation.
Therefore, our -neighborhood attack is a successful one to
resist distilled network.
C. Speed Improvements
Besides distillation resistance, our attack greatly increases
the speed of generating adversarial examples compared with
C&W. Although we are using the same optimizer (Adam),
our runtime of producing one adversarial example is several
or even tens of times shorter than that of C&W. Almost
all previous researches focus on minimize the perturbation
(maybe based on different norms: `0, `2, `∞) as one term
of the objective function in optimization. And another term
is always the loss function measuring the success of attack.
1In our actual execution, we add another term c on the w to balance the
optimization, where c = −arctanh( b+a−1
b−a ). So the optimization function is
minimize
w
Lt(
b−a
2
tanh (w + c)+ b+a
2
). And our experiment shows that it
will make a little contribution to the processing speed.
Just as in C&W, its objective is minimize
δ
‖δ‖2 + c · l(x+ δ).
It is the sum of two terms, and c is a balancing weight.
In the optimization process, C&W has to find an optimal c
by binary search, which consumes a long time. However, in
our -neighborhood attack, we do not need to minimize the
perturbation as one optimization term, and we integrate the
two constraints (maximum perturbation constraint and image
validity constraint) into the final loss function. This makes our
function has only one term, so it is easier to solve the problem
directly by optimizer without the need of auxiliary calculation.
D. Visual Quality
Although our objective function does not minimize the total
perturbation, it still ensures good visual quality of the adversar-
ial examples. Intuitively, several large perturbations to pixels
are spread to the entire image by presetting the upper bound.
The experiment will show that we can always get a lower
maximum adversarial perturbation on an image than C&W
attack on the MNIST [31], CIFAR10 [32] and ImageNet [23]
dataset. Its immediate benefit is that the adversarial examples
generated by our -neighborhood attack will absolutely not
have obvious bright spots, which can cause the most damage
on the visual effect of images. This is more in line with
the requested perceptually invisibility of adversarial examples.
And better still, on the ImageNet dataset, our adversarial
perturbations sometimes have even smaller total distortion than
C&W. Recall that C&W attack needs to binary search the
optimal balance weight c, but it cannot find the proper c all
the time.
V. ATTACKS ON BLACK-BOX DISTILLED MODEL
In this section, we describe our attacks on the black-box
distilled model. One limitation of C&W attack is that it is a
white-box attack. It has to use the output of the inner layer
(logits) during its optimization. As for the black-box attack,
however, what we can use is only the output probabilities. To
the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to implement
black-box attack against defensively distilled networks.
A. Substitute Probability for Logits
In order to avoid the use of logits, we need to find a
substitute in the loss function (4). Our idea is replacing logits
Z(x) with log f(x). Then the loss function is:
L˜t(x) = max(maxi6=t{log f(x)i} − log f(x)t,−κ) (7)
We can derive it is exactly equivalent to the loss function (4)
with logits. As mentioned in Section II-A,
f(x)i =
eZ(x)i∑m
i=1 e
Z(x)i
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
So the difference between two log value is
log f(x)i − log f(x)j
=(Z(x)i − log
m∑
i=1
eZ(x)i)− (Z(x)j − log
m∑
j=1
eZ(x)j )
=Z(x)i − Z(x)j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m
Therefore, we can conclude that the loss function L˜t(x) only
with f(x), is equal to Lt(x) using logits Z(x). We do not
need to know the internal information of network anymore
during the optimization process, but just query the final output
probabilities. By substituting the log value of probability for
logits, black-box attack can be achieved.
B. Our Region-based Attack
Defensively distilled networks lead to such a “hard” output
vector for any input image that generating adversarial exam-
ples becomes very difficult. And for a black-box attack, what
we can only use is the “hard” vector. The “hard” means the
largest output probability is 1.0 or very close to 1.0, and others
are all 0 or nearly 0. We find it still difficult for us to solve the
optimization problem on distilled networks, even if we use the
black-box loss function (7). Our experiment shows that in the
optimization procedure, “hard” output leads to the initial loss
value is ∞, and after several iterations, the loss converges
to a positive number, which indicates that the attack is not
successful. Intuitively, if we assume an image as a point in
the high-dimensional feature hyperspace, then distillation will
make the point very “stubborn”. No matter how we try to
move the point towards the direction of the target class, it still
cannot get out of its original class region.
To solve the problem mentioned above, we transform the
optimization on a data point to lots of points in a region in the
hyperspace. More specifically, in each optimization iteration,
we add Gaussian noise on the current image to make its
corresponding point in hyperspace slightly deviate from its
position. Then we calculate the loss of the noise-added image,
and minimize it by the Adam optimizer. After many iterations,
it will eventually find a route, along which the data point will
rush out of its original class region into the target region in
the hyperspace. The process is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Region-based Attack on Black-box Classifier
Input: Original image x, iteration number N , maximum
perturbation .
Output: Adversarial example x′.
Initialize: x0 ⇐ x, i ⇐ 0
while i < N && L˜t(x; ) > 0 do
xnoisei ⇐ xi +N (0, σ2);
Calculate L˜t(x; );
Get δi according to L˜t(x; ) by Adam optimizer;
Update xi+1 ⇐ xi + δi;
i⇐ i+ 1
end while
x′ ⇐ xi
return x′
For the corresponding point of a fixed image, it is like its
classification boundary becoming a barrier due to the effect
of distillation. So it is difficult for us to add adversarial
perturbations to move the point away from its original class
region, as if the point is trapped in a cage with the limited
range of motion. The role of the added noise is dragging the
Fig. 2: Our Region-based Attack: We simplify the entire
hyperspace into a two-dimensional plane. The point x stands
for original image, x′ is our target adversarial example. For
any image, it is located in a specific region corresponding
to its label, and as shown in this figure, it is surrounded by
its classification boundary. Attackers aim to move x to the
position of x′ out of this region by adding adversarial pertur-
bation δadv(x, F ) (F is the -neighborhood attack). However,
distillation makes the boundary become very firm, like an “iron
wall”, and points trying to rush out of the border will be
“bounced”, but it can move freely inside its own region. In
our region-based attack, we first let x move to the position
of xnoise by adding perturbation δnoise(x,G) (G is the method
of adding noise, here we use Gaussian noise). For the point
xnoise, it has its own unbreakable boundary. Then we easily
move xnoise inside its region (adding δadv(xnoise, F )) until it
arrives at the area not belonging to the limited range of x.
point towards the edge of the range, and the noise-add image
corresponds to a new point. For the new point, it has a new
range with a different barrier from the old one, and it can only
move in the new region. It is nice that there is a part of region
which is in the new range but not in the original range. So
we can easily move it across its firm barriers (classification
boundary) caused by distillation with the method of dragging
it a little away from its original position at first by adding
noise. Our idea is illustrated in Fig.2.
As mentioned above, the “hard” output of distilled network
leads to the initial loss value is ∞. So in the actual imple-
mentation, we add a little disturbance ∆f for each output
probability f(x)i to avoid meaningless value like log 0. This
trick can make our algorithm effectively reduce the loss to a
negative value.
In addition, the adversarial examples constructed by this
attack are very robust against the defense that preprocesses
input images by adding noise. In other words, not only the
adversarial example itself can force the network to classify
it into the target class, but also after adding some noise it
can still be classified into that class. The reason is that we
transform an optimization problem based on a single point
into one based on a region. Therefore, the final adversarial
example we produce is also suitable for many images around
the original one.
C. Our Bypass Attack on Black-box Distilled Network with
Great T Value
The distillation temperature T is an important hyper-
parameter during the defensive training. If it is too small,
the defense will not work effectively, but if too large, the
classification accuracy of the network on the original images
will be decreased. So it is neccessary for defenders to find
an appropriate T , and attackers do not know how much it is.
Our experiments show that carrying out a black-box attack
on a network with a great T value is quite difficult. The
attack described in Section V-B is really effective when the
temperature is not too large, but its success rate is not very
high for great T . So here we propose a bypass attack on black-
box distilled network with a great T value.
Our bypass attack is a circuitous mechanism. We discover
that adversarial examples for different distillation temperatures
have the property of transferability. So in our bypass attack,
we do not confront the network directly, but choose to attack
a network with a relatively low temperature T . Our following
experiments will show that the adversarial examples generated
from small-T network can also attack great-T network at a
relatively high success rate, which is higher than attacking
directly.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we illustrate the effectiveness of our attacks:
the -neighborhood attack on white-box defensively distilled
networks, the region-based attack on black-box distilled model
and the bypass attack on models with high distillation temper-
ature. We will evaluate them from several aspects: success rate,
runtime and image distortion (visual quality).
A. Setup
1) Dataset: We evaluate our attacks on three image
datasets, MNIST [31], CIFAR10 [32] and ImageNet [23].
In each dataset, we select 1000 images to test the attacks.
For every image in MNIST, we generate targeted adversarial
examples of all the other 9 classes, so finally we get 9000
adversarial examples. And since CIFAR10 has 10 classes
too, we also make attacks on all the other 9 classes. This
evaluation can fully reflect the effectiveness of our attacks. As
for ImageNet with 1000 classes itself, we randomly select any
other 10 classes as attack targets.
2) DNN models: For MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, we
use the same DNN models as in the C&W attack, as shown in
Table I. And our training method and the selected hyperparam-
eters are also the same as it. To explore the relation between
our attacks and distillation temperature, we train 12 models
with T = {1, 5, 10, 20, 30, ..., 90, 100} on each datasets. As for
the huge and more challenging ImageNet dataset, we use the
pretrained Inception-v3 model [24] with 96.4% top-5 accuracy.
TABLE I: Network Architectures of MNIST and CIFAR10.
Layer Type MNIST CIFAR10
Conv.ReLU 3×3×32 3×3×64
Conv.ReLU 3×3×32 3×3×64
Max pooling 2×2 2×2
Conv.ReLU 3×3×64 3×3×128
Conv.ReLU 3×3×64 3×3×128
Max pooling 2×2 2×2
Fully Connect.ReLU 200 256
Fully Connect.ReLU 200 256
Softmax 10 10
3) Implementation: our implementation is completed on a
machine with 64GB RAM, Intel Core i7-5960X CPU and two
Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 GPU cards. And all the code is
based on the deep learning framework Tensorflow.
B. Performance of -neighborhood Attack
1) Success Rate and Distortion: Our -neighborhood tar-
geted attack can achieve 100% success rate on any target label
and the distortion to images is acceptable with a comparable
level of C&W attack. Better still, for RGB images in CIFAR10
and ImageNet, the visual quality of our adversarial examples
is more advantageous. First we test our method on the original
models for MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet, Fig.3 shows
that the attack success rate of any target class can achieve
100% with a proper preset maximum perturbation parameter
, and our attack can succeed, no matter which class the
original image belongs to, and which class is the target. Fig.3
also indicates the tradeoff between maximum perturbation and
success rate. For MNIST and CIFAR10, when  is greater or
equal to 50 and 7 respectively, the success rate reaches up to
100%. And for ImageNet, the  value can be just 2. Actually,
our experiment shows that we can achieve more than 70%
success rate even if  is fixed to 1. When applied to distilled
models, our attack can also achieve almost 100% success rate.
The result on CIFAR10 can be found in Fig.4. When  > 9,
the success rate has been nearly 100% for a large range of
distillation temperature (for undistilled models, this value of 
is 7). So we do not need to add much more perturbation for
distilled networks compared with undistilled models.
The generated adversarial examples are shown in Fig.9
for MNIST, Fig.10 for CIFAR10, and Fig.11 for ImageNet.
Human eyes completely cannot tell the difference between
the original images and adversarial examples on CIFAR10
and ImageNet. Here we compare our method with C&W `2
attack in the amount of the modification to images. The result
is shown in Table II. The max perturbation is the largest
modification to all pixels of an image, and the value in the table
is the mean max perturbation of all our test 9000 images. The
total distortion is Euclidean distance between our adversarial
examples and original images (`2 norm), and we also record
the mean value of 9000 images. From Table II, we can see that,
when the success rates of the two attacks are both 100%, on
MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset, our total distortion is larger than
C&W, but our max perturbation to an image is much smaller
than that. The reason is that, in our optimization process,
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Fig. 3: Success Rate of Attack on Undistilled Model under
Different Preset Maximum Perturbation . For each dataset,
when  exceeds a certain value, the success rate can reach up
to 100%.
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Fig. 4: Success Rate of Attack on Models with Differ-
ent Distillation Temperatures on CIFAR10. We set  as
{8,9,10,11}. Their success rates are all high, and when  > 10,
the success rate can reach up to 100%.
we have restrictions on the maximum modification, while in
C&W `2, it is aimed at finding the minimum total distortion.
Intuitively, several large perturbations to pixels in C&W attack
are spread to the entire image with our method. On ImageNet,
we can find that in both aspects of max perturbation and
total distortion, our -neighborhood attack is better. The largest
modification to each pixel of our attack is no more than 2, and
the total distortion is also lower than C&W. So our adversarial
perturbation is less obvious and more imperceptible, as shown
in Fig.5. In addition, we discover that, even if we preset the
allowed maximum perturbation , the final largest perturbation
TABLE II: Distortion to Images of Our -neighborhood
Attack compared with C&W Attack, when the success rates
of two methods are both 100%.
Max Perturbation Total Distortion
Our  C&W Our  C&W
MINST (=52) 48.1 146.4 778.2 532.5
CIFAR10 (=10) 5.6 11.6 194.5 107.6
ImageNet (=2) 1.5 12.1 363.5 384.0
(a) Original. (b) C&W. (c) Our .
Fig. 5: Comparison of Adversarial Perturbation (×30)
between C&W Attack and -neighborhood Attack. There
exist obvious bright spots in (b) C&W attack, which indicates
it modifies a lot to several pixels. But in (c) our attack, the
perturbation is more imperceptible.
is usually smaller than that. It can be explained as follows:
The  is a searching space we limit for our optimization
problem. A larger  means we allow the algorithm to modify
the original image in a larger range. But even so, it may not
be necessary to modify till the preset maximum range  in
the actual optimization process. Therefore, the real maximum
perturbation is usually smaller than .
2) Runtime: Our -neighborhood attack has a great advan-
tage over the C&W algorithm in terms of processing speed.
As shown in Table III, our runtime is much shorter than C&W
attack on these three datasets.
If we can tolerate a larger , the processing speed will be
faster. The more perturbation we allow to add, the more easily
the optimal solution will be found. Thus the runtime will
be shorter. It is a tradeoff between  and runtime, as shown
in Fig.6. The three curves all start from the  which makes
the attack success rate reach 100%. We can find that, when
the success rate has just reached 100% with a certain , the
runtime may be a little long. But at this time, we only need
to slightly increase , the runtime will decline sharply, and the
visual quality will not deteriorate. If attackers hope to generate
TABLE III: Runtime Comparison of Generating Adversarial
Examples on Three Datasets by Two Attacks.
Our  (s /image) C&W (s /image)
MNIST (=52) 0.53 2.11
CIFAR10 (=10) 0.07 1.18
ImageNet (=2) 4.27 79.80
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Fig. 6: Runtime with Different . It descends rapidly when
 increases on the three datasets. The three curves all begin
with the  which makes the attack success rate reaches 100%.
adversarial examples faster, they can set a slightly larger . In
a word, with the method of our -neighborhood attack, the
attackers can choose  as needed, while the process time of
all the previous attacks cannot be controlled by attackers.
C. Performance of Attacks on Black-box Distilled Model
Aimed at black-box distilled models, we propose two
attacks. First we evaluate the performance of our region-
based attack. We generate adversarial examples on black-box
networks with T = {5, 10, 20, ..., 100}, the success rates are
shown in Fig.7. Compared with the previous attack described
in [14], the performance of our region-based attack has greatly
improved. It shows that the idea of transforming the point-
based optimization into region-based optimization is effective.
Although distillation operation makes the output probability
so “hard” that the optimization becomes very difficult, our
region-based attack soften it by constantly adding noise during
optimization. We make it possible to produce adversarial
examples on “hard” probability.
However, when T is very large (T = 100), the success rate
is still unsatisfactory (about 35%). It indicates that distilled
networks with great T are too robust for the region-based
method to attack. Under these circumstances, we utilize the
transferability of adversarial examples on models with differ-
ent distillation temperatures to achieve our bypass attack. This
circuitous mechanism is more effective than the direct method.
We craft adversarial examples on a distilled model with low
temperature, and use them to attack the models with high
temperatures. Our experiments show that the attack success
rate at other high temperatures can almost achieve the same
level as the low temperature itself, as shown in Fig.7. There is
a strong transferability among models with different T . When
adversarial examples generated for the network with a certain
temperature are tested at other temperatures, the success rates
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Fig. 7: The Effectiveness of Our Black-box Attack. The
previous attack is decribed in [14]. We generate adversarial ex-
amples on the distilled network with T = {5, 10, 20, ..., 100}
by our region-based attack. And we implement our bypass
attack by constructing adversarial examples on models with
T = 5 and using them to attack distilled networks with other
various T .
are usually similar, whether they are high or low, shown in
Table IV, the values in a row are very close.
In our two attacks on black-box distilled models, the noise
intensity is a quite important parameter. Since we transform
the point-based problem into a region-based problem by
adding Gaussian noise in each iteration of optimization, the
noise intensity can be just thought of the radius of the region.
Here we use the standard deviation σ of added Gaussian noise
to measure its intensity. Different noise in our attack will cause
a big difference in the final success rate.
As shown in Fig.8, we add Gaussian noise with standard
deviation in range of [0, 1.0]. We attack directly on the distilled
model with T = 5, and then use the generated adversarial
examples to test on models with other T . For the distillation
temperature T = 5, the best noise is σ = 0.4. The role of
the noise is to make the corresponding point of the image
deviate from its original position in the hyperspace. If we do
not add noise or the noise intensity is too low, the point will
not move, so the optimization is difficult to be carried on.
We notice that when σ = 0, that is to say, we do not add
any noise and directly attack black-box models in the same
way with white-box -neighborhood attack, only replace the
logits with classification probability, the success rate is about
20%. But if we add a little noise (σ = 0.4), the success rate
will increase to over 85%. This indicates the effectiveness of
our region-based idea. When σ is too large, too much noise
will be added in each optimization iteration. This makes it
quite difficult to search an overall optimal solution, and the
loss cannot decrease to below 0, so the attack will not be
successful.
TABLE IV: Bypass Attack between Different Distillation Temperature. We directly generate adversarial examples on
distilled models with T = {5, 10, 20, 70, 100}, and we test the generated adversarial examples on models with a large range
of temperatures T = {5, 10, 20, ..., 100}.
T = 5 T = 10 T = 20 T = 30 T = 40 T = 50 T = 60 T = 70 T = 80 T = 90 T = 100
T = 5 0.866 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.822 0.777 0.833 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.788
T = 10 0.644 0.644 0.666 0.6 0.6 0.555 0.6 0.533 0.577 0.622 0.555
T = 20 0.466 0.488 0.555 0.466 0.444 0.444 0.488 0.444 0.466 0.533 0.466
T = 70 0.377 0.4 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.288 0.4 0.422 0.333 0.422 0.355
T = 100 0.266 0.311 0.244 0.266 0.244 0.266 0.0.244 0.244 0.244 0.266 0.266
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Fig. 8: Success Rate under Noise with Different Intensity
in Region-based Attack. When we use Gaussian noise with
different standard deviation σ in the optimization process,
the final effectiveness is also different. We directly attack
the model with distillation temperature T = 5, and test the
adversarial examples on models with T = 10, 40, 100.
Therefore in our black-box attack, noise intensity σ is a
critical parameter that determines whether it will be successful.
And for different temperature T , the optimal σ may be
different, we can adopt a certain search algorithm, e.g. binary
search, to find a suitable one. In addition, the effect of noise
on our black-box bypass attack has the same trend as that on
our direct region-based attack, as shown in Fig. 8. If a certain
σ causes a good performance of direct attack, it will also work
well at other temperatures by our bypass attack.
Better still, to a certain extent, our black-box attacks can
be resistant to noise. Defensers may try to add noise onto
the generated adversarial examples for damaging them and
making them recover to the original correct label. If the noise
intensity they add is no more than that in the process of our
black-box attack, the classification results will still remain the
targeted labels. The success rate of adding noise on adversarial
examples can be as high as those without noise. From a
different perspective, given an image, we do not just find
one adversarial example, but find a lot. In the hyperspace,
points in a region centered on the point corresponding to the
generated adversarial example are all adversarial examples as
well. This kind of robust anti-noise adversarial example may
be a powerful opponent for defenders.
D. Discussion on Our Black-box Attack
The analysis above shows that we can combine our region-
based attack and bypass attack in the black-box setting. When
the distillation temperature T of model is not high, the region-
based attack can succeed directly; otherwise, the bypass attack
can be used by generating adversarial examples on a small-
T model, without knowing any result of inner layers in the
network. Actually, our bypass attack is not, strictly speaking,
under black-box setting. Because if T of the model is very
large, we cannot succeed in attacking directly. So we need to
produce adversarial examples with the assistance of another
model with a small T . But we usually do not have the auxiliary
model. The black-box here just refers that we only need the
final output probabilities instead of the inner layers’ results.
Despite this, our bypass attack can still be applied in
some specific scenarios. For example, many companies pro-
vide machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) classifiers, from
which users can get classification results when they input
an image, or users can develop other applications via their
prediction APIs. MLaaS is a black-box model and the model
itself might be commercially valuable to model owners, so
it just provides query operation. As we mentioned above,
distillation can improve the robustness and security of a
model and make it hard to be attacked. When the distillation
temperature goes up, the security will be enhanced but model’s
accuracy will drop. So a company might deploy multiple
distilled models with different temperatures on several clouds
to meet various user requirements for both utility and security.
Under these circumstances, attackers can easily use bypass
attack to generate adversarial examples on low-temperature
distilled model (utility first) and attack the high-temperature
one (security first), even though which has such a high level
of security that it is almost impossible to attack directly.
On another scenario, for a better tradeoff between utility
and security, MLaaS providers need to train an optimal dis-
tilled model from an original undistilled model by constantly
increasing the temperature. Users might have access to the
historical models, that is, the trained models with not high
temperatures. Then the final optimal model can be attacked by
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Fig. 9: Targeted Adversarial Examples on MNIST. We
randomly selected 10 images, respectively belonging to class
{0,1,2,...,9}. For each test image, we generate adversarial
examples of all the other 9 target classes, as shown in each row.
The underlined image on the diagonal is the original image.
our bypass method. Or MLaaS providers might upgrade their
old model with low temperature into a high-temperature one in
order to enhance security. In this case, the adversarial examples
generated on low-temperature model can be saved and used
to attack the newly enhanced models effectively. In short, we
conclude that, in the black-box MLaaS, with the method of
bypass attack, once the original model or the distilled models
with low temperatures was released sometime in the past, its
corresponding enhanced model will be not secure anymore, no
matter what a high distillation temperature is used to upgrade
the model.
VII. CONCLUSION
The existence of adversarial examples proves that DNNs
are not robust to the input. And this vulnerability hinders the
deployment of DNN systems. Defensively distilled DNN is
currently the most effective defense to restrain the generation
of adversarial examples. Although the state-of-the-art C&W
attack can defeat it with 100% probability in the white-box
setting, it still does not work in the more general black-box
setting.
In this paper, we first present the -neighborhood attack.
This method enables us to control the maximum perturbation
of each pixel in an image, thus ensuring a high visual quality of
adversarial examples. Also, we show that our method can find
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Fig. 10: Targeted Adversarial Examples on CIFAF10. We
randomly selected 10 images, respectively belonging to class
{1,2,...,10}. For each test image, we generate adversarial
examples of all the other 9 target classes, as shown in each row.
The underlined image on the diagonal is the original image.
the targeted perturbations very fast. On this basis, we further
propose the region-based and the bypass attack, which show
that the distillation does not provide enough security assurance
to DNNs. An attacker can still generate adversarial examples
with a high success rate, even though he only knows the final
output probabilities of the target DNN.
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